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Quantum formalism to describe binocular rivalry
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On the basis of the general character and operation of the process of perception, a formalism is
sought to mathematically describe the subjective or abstract/mental process of perception. It
is shown that the formalism of orthodox quantum theory of measurement, where the observer
plays a key role, is a broader mathematical foundation which can be adopted to describe the
dynamics of the subjective experience. The mathematical formalism describes the psychophysical
dynamics of the subjective or cognitive experience as communicated to us by the subject.
Subsequently, the formalism is used to describe simple perception processes and, in particular,
to describe the probability distribution of dominance duration obtained from the testimony
of subjects experiencing binocular rivalry. Using this theory and parameters based on known
values of neuronal oscillation frequencies and firing rates, the calculated probability distribution
of dominance duration of rival states in binocular rivalry under various conditions is found
to be in good agreement with available experimental data. This theory naturally explains an
observed marked increase in dominance duration in binocular rivalry upon periodic interrup-
tion of stimulus and yields testable predictions for the distribution of perceptual alteration in time.
Keywords: Binocular rivalry, multi-stable perception, temporal perception, psychophysical dy-
namics
I. INTRODUCTION
Several authors (London and Bauer, 1983;
Manousakis, 2006; Mavromatos and Nanopoulos,
1998; Penrose, 1989; Schwartz et al., 2005; Stapp,
1980, 2003, 2007) including the founders of quantum
mechanics (Jung and Pauli, 2001; Schroedinger, 1967;
Von-Neumann, 1955; Wigner, 1983) have discussed the
possible relation of consciousness to quantum theory.
It has also been argued that the mathematical formu-
lation of quantum mechanics is a broader foundation
(Manousakis, 2006) which can be adopted to describe
the most elementary mental events, i.e., the subjective
experience of the process of perception. In the present
paper, on the basis of the general character and opera-
tion of the process of perception, it is suggested that the
formalism of orthodox quantum theory can be adopted
to mathematically describe the subjective or mental
process of perception. We stress that the mathematical
formalism presented here does not aim at describing
the brain dynamics of the observer as measured by an
observing instrument or by a second external observer
observing the brain of the first, but rather its aim is to
describe the dynamics of the subjective or mental ex-
perience as communicated by the first observer himself.
Namely, we seek a formulation to describe the dynamics
of the abstract or mental process of the subjective
experience or the process of perception, for example, the
testimony of observers quantified by the recordings of
a time series of events occurring in their experience of
binocular rivalry. What is meant by these statements is
clarified in the following section by means of a simple
example.
As described in the following section, an attempt is
made to give a precise mathematical description of the
character and operational nature of the process of per-
ception as experienced by subjects; it is argued and
demonstrated in Sec. II by means of examples that the
mathematical formalism of standard quantum mechan-
ics, as we currently know it, may be sufficient to quanti-
tatively describe aspects of our conscious experience and
abstract mental processes. The difference between the
earlier work on the connection between quantum theory
and consciousness and the present work is that, here,
we postulate and we present arguments to justify it, that
the formalism of quantum theory can be used to describe
mathematically the subjective or mental processes, such
as the operation of perception in binocular rivalry. The
formalism is constructed with the goal to describe em-
pirical data which are recordings of the experience of ob-
servers to various stimuli, without a need to identify a
material system where the function of perception is mani-
fested. Namely, the aim is to describe the inner or mental
experiences of observers, and, the goal is not to describe
an objectively existing physical system. In the present
paper, we explore further the quantitative connection of
the formalism of quantum theory using the formalism
of standard quantum theory (Manousakis, 2006; Stapp,
1980, 2003, 2007; Von-Neumann, 1955) and by apply-
ing the formulation to the well-known psycho-physical
phenomenon of binocular rivalry (Blake and Logothetis,
2002; Leopold and Logothetis, 1999; Tong et al., 2006).
The theory presented here should find application in
psycho-physical phenomena where elementary aspects of
the process of perception are demonstrated.
The problem of binocular rivalry has a long history,
2and there are successful models (Freeman, 2005) to de-
scribe it using concepts and tools of the classical com-
putational neuroscience. The aim of the present paper
is not to show that the quantum formalism is the only
way to describe the experimental results on binocular ri-
valry or that the above mentioned classical approach is
insufficient. Its purpose is, rather, to examine whether
or not the available empirical data pertaining to binocu-
lar rivalry fit well with the results of a model where the
formalism of quantum theory is applied to a simple two
state system. It is demonstrated that the application
of orthodox quantum theory works well and, therefore,
might constitute a useful foundation for understanding
the connection of the central nervous system to the sub-
jective perception and qualia. It might, therefore, be
complementary to models of classical neuroscience. The
basic formalism used in the present paper is identical
to that of standard quantum theory in conjunction with
the ideas and the interpretation presented in the works
of Von Neumann (Von-Neumann, 1955) Stapp (Stapp,
2003) and Manousakis (Manousakis, 2006). However, the
reader does not necessarily have to resort to these works
because we have made an attempt to make this document
self-contained. Namely, all the necessary mathematical
apparatus is introduced here in the following section and
is adopted to describe binocular rivalry.
II. GENERAL FORMULATION
A. Potentiality and actuality
Figure 1 An ambiguous drawing: It can be interpreted as a
folded paper with its edge inward or outward of the plane of
the drawing.
In Fig.1 we present an ambiguous drawing in order to
provide a simple example of the utility of the concept of
potential consciousness which will be used in describing
perception. Notice that our consciousness offers two po-
tential interpretations of this ambiguous figure: We can
perceive it as a folded paper with its edge below or above
the plane of the drawing. The reader is encouraged (a)
first to try to perceive each of these two interpretations
separately, and (b) while watching the drawing to try to
stick to one of the two interpretations. Notice that the
suggestion (b) is difficult to follow because the two dif-
ferent interpretations alternate in perception every few
seconds. Therefore, there are two different potential per-
ceptions of this figure, let us say, symbolically 1 and 2,
the one in which the edge is below and the one in which
the edge is above the plane respectively. If we ask: “what
is the actual figure, is one in which the edge is above or
below the plane?” The answer to this question is: “nei-
ther” or, equivalently, the answer can be also: “both”.
This reminds us of the question: “where is the electron
in the atom?”
One of the claims of the present paper is that the best
way to describe the state of our consciousness between
such perceptual events can be written as:
|v〉 = c1|1〉+ c2|2〉 =
(
c1
c2
)
, (1)
where |1〉 and |2〉 denote two orthogonal unit vectors
spanning a vector space and the coefficients c1, c2, in
general, are complex numbers. The reason for using this
notation (known in physics as Dirac notation) is for a
notational convenience which will become clear in the
following few steps. The unit vector |1〉 corresponds to
one of the perceptions and the unit vector |2〉 to the other
perception. The vector |v〉 given by the linear combina-
tion in Eq. 1 describes the state of potential consciousness
which corresponds to the stimulus which is neither 1 nor
2; it becomes (or it is realized as) 1 or 2 through the event
of a particular perception. In a similar sense the process
of measurement in quantum theory (which, in the prob-
lem discussed here, corresponds to the conscious realiza-
tion or conscious event) brings into existence a particular
“reality” through the so-called wave-function “collapse”.
We will see in the following subsection that the coeffi-
cients c1, c2 are related to the likelihood that the state 1
or 2 will be realized at a given time. Notice that, as spe-
cial cases the state described by Eq. 1 includes the “pure”
states 1 and 2, but the state of potential consciousness
is neither; it corresponds to the linear combination given
by Eq. 1. This vector |v〉, which corresponds to the state
of potential consciousness, changes in time and we will
discuss the equation which gives its time evolution in
Sec. II.C. When we perceive the stimulus as either 1 or
2, a perceptual event occurs which brings into perception
one or the other experience. We may use the expression
that, when state (or interpretation) 1 occurs, the state
of potential consciousness |v〉 “collapses” to |1〉. In order
to describe the dynamics of such perceptual or mental
events we will use the notion of potential consciousness
and we will show that such a tool is very useful in de-
scribing the evolution and distribution of dominance du-
rations in binocular rivalry. In order to achieve that, we
need an equation to describe the time-evolution of this
state. However, before we discuss this, we should intro-
duce a few other prerequisites.
3Given two vectors
|v〉 =
(
c1
c2
)
, |v′〉 =
(
c′1
c′2
)
,
describing two different states of potential consciousness,
we define the inner product in a Hilbert space, in the
familiar way, as
〈v|v′〉 = (c∗1, c
∗
2)
(
c′1
c′2
)
≡ c∗1c
′
1 + c
∗
2c
′
2. (2)
Notice that in a Hilbert space, the complex conjugate of
the first vector in the inner product is used. This allows
us to define a norm, a measure, in this space, namely,
the inner product of a vector with itself is a positive real
number and can be used as the measure of the “length”
of the vector. Also notice in the above notation that
we may regard the vector |v′〉 as a 2 × 1 matrix and we
may regard the entity 〈v| ≡ (c∗1, c
∗
2) as a 1 × 2 matrix
obtained as the transpose of |v〉, i.e., by converting its
rows into columns and taking the complex conjugate of
its elements. In this way, the inner product of two vectors
is the matrix multiplication of a 1×2 with a 2×1 matrix
as shown in Eq. 2 above. In addition, this justifies the
origin of the notation 〈v|v′〉 used for the inner product.
Now, the absolute magnitude of the inner product
between two vectors can also be used to measure how
“close” to one another these vectors are. For example,
two vectors having zero inner product, implies that these
two vectors are orthogonal to each other and this is the
largest possible difference between two vectors. Two vec-
tors, each normalized to unity (the norm of each of the
vectors is 1), with inner product equal to 1, implies that
these two vectors are identical. The inner product will
be used in the next subsection where we need to compare
two states of potential consciousness.
Therefore, in order to provide a description for the
process of perception as a mental (as opposed to a phys-
ical) process we introduce a state of potential conscious-
ness which includes the potentialities and the likelihoods
for all possible conscious experiences. This state evolves
in time and it drastically changes by actual conscious
events. To describe this mathematically, for the general
case, we write the state of potential consciousness as a
vector or a linear superposition of all potential events |i〉,
i.e.,
|ψ〉 =
N∑
i=1
ci|i〉 =


c1
.
.
.
cN

 , (3)
where ci are, in general, complex numbers and they are
related to the probability to actualize the event i whose
potentiality is represented by the basis vector |i〉. The set
of all possible potential events |i〉 forms a complete basis
in a Hilbert space describing all potential outcomes.
B. Operation of Consciousness and observation
The previous example tells us, that the stimuli have
in some sense an “unfathomable” existence, or they exist
as potentialities, namely, we can not talk about them di-
rectly but only of how they are perceived, i.e., after they
have been operated upon by the process of conscious per-
ception. The cake is not sweet before we experience the
taste produced through the reaction of our sensory appa-
ratus; before it is tasted, it is potentially sweet. Hence,
these potentialities can be actualized directly through the
action of the corresponding “organ” of perception in the
brain. This operation of consciousness called perception
or measurement causes an actual experience and an ac-
tual conscious event.
The state of potential consciousness becomes an actu-
ality, i.e., a conscious event occurs, through the operation
of conscious attention. For example, imagine that you are
having dinner with a number of friends in a round table
and several conversations between sub-groups take place
simultaneously. When you pay attention or participate
in one of the discussions, while the other physical stimuli
such as voices come to your instruments of perception,
these other stimuli fade and you become aware only of
the discussion to which you are paying conscious atten-
tion. One can voluntarily switch from one conversation
to another by making an effort to enhance the probabil-
ity of having a “collapse” in a particular desired sector
of potential events.
In order to describe this operative process of conscious-
ness we conceptualize consciousness (the thinker) as an
actor (or operator) which acts on the state of potential
consciousness and makes actual one of the various poten-
tialities. For example, consciousness can only perceive
change, i.e., differences, variations, alterations. Imag-
ine an observer who had no prior experiences at all and,
suddenly, the observer begins to have a stream of ex-
periences. The observer compares his new observation
with a bank of prior experiences and this makes observa-
tion a comparative process. The comparative character
of the perceptual measurement process is also demon-
strated by psychophysical evidence for contextual effects
(Schwartz et al., 2007). Namely, the perception of a tar-
get input depends strongly on both its spatial context
(what surrounds a given object) and its temporal context
(what has been observed in the recent past). At first, this
idea that we only observe change, might be difficult to
accept because we know that we are able to observe a
static object. In actuality, however, we are able to ob-
serve the object because of the constant change caused
on our retina by the light coming from the object. This
change produces an electric potential difference which
will cause a neuron to fire. In order to be able to see
the same static object “continuously”, the neuron has to
be charged anew and when it “fires”, it causes a per-
ception. Therefore, one of the functions or operations of
consciousness is to be able to perceive a change. The op-
erator which measures change in space is the differential
4operator ∇, while the operator which measures tempo-
ral changes is ∂t and both act on the state of potential
consciousness |v〉.
However, we need to answer the following fundamen-
tal question: how does consciousness see or measure a
change in the absence of an a priori content of memory
to be used for comparison? What is the standard, or the
measure, which consciousness should use in order to mea-
sure the new state? Namely, consciousness operates an
inquiry (a question) which is represented by a particular
operator Qˆ (a matrix) which acts on the state of poten-
tial consciousness |v〉 and during this operation a new,
transient, state of potential consciousness results which
we represent as |v′〉 = Qˆ|v〉 . Only one state from the set
of the various potentialities will be actualized after the
measurement; which one?
Let us analyze this question in terms of the example
given above regarding the ambiguous figure. In this case,
consciousness poses the question: Q = “Is the observed
in state |1〉 ?” (|1〉 and |2〉 represent the two alternative
states corresponding to the alternative percepts observed
when observing the folded paper in Fig.1). The projec-
tion operator associated with the above inquiry Q is
Qˆ =
(
1 0
0 0
)
, (4)
i.e., depending on the state, it acts as follows:
(a) if |v〉 = |1〉 =
(
1
0
)
, then, Qˆ|1〉 = |1〉,
(b) if |v〉 = |2〉 =
(
0
1
)
, then, Qˆ|2〉 = 0.
Now, how does consciousness measures the outcome of
this inquiry? It has no measure or standard by which
to carry out the measurement, other than the state of
potential consciousness just before the inquiry, i.e., |v〉
given by Eq. 2. Namely, the likelihood that the answer
to this question is “yes” should be given by the com-
parison of the state |v′〉 = Qˆ|v〉 with the state |v〉 itself.
Mathematically, this is evaluated by the inner product
between theses two potential states, i.e., 〈v|v′〉 and this
notation is defined by Eq. 2. As discussed in the previous
subsection the inner product measures how close to each
other two states of potential consciousness are. Thus,
during the mental event or experience or “collapse” of
the state of potential consciousness, the expected value
of an observable Qˆ is
〈Qˆ〉 = 〈v|Qˆ|v〉. (5)
Namely, this is the probability for the answer to the above
inquiry to be “yes”.
C. Evolution of potential consciousness
When we consider the time evolution of any vector
|ψ(t)〉 it is useful to define a different set of vectors form-
ing a complete basis of the same Hilbert space. Such a
basis set is formed by all the periodic states |ν〉t charac-
terized by frequency ων (and period Tν = 2π/ων), i.e.,
|ν〉t+Tν = |ν〉t; the time evolution of these states is given
by
|ν〉t = e
±iωνt|ν〉; |ν〉 = |ν〉0, (6)
and we define an operator ωˆ which is a diagonal matrix
in the basis |ν〉 with eigenvalues ων , i.e.,
ωˆ|ν〉 = ων |ν〉. (7)
The matrix ωˆ is Hermitian, namely, 〈i|ωˆ|j〉 = (〈j|ωˆ|i〉)∗
because it has real eigenvalues. The time-dependent state
of potential consciousness can be expanded in a Fourier
transformation as follows:
|ψ(t)〉 =
∑
ν
eiωνtcν |ν〉, (8)
where cν are Fourier expansion coefficients and, here, the
sum is over both negative and positive ων .
Using the definition of ωˆ, Eq. 8 can be written as fol-
lows:
|ψ(t)〉 = eiωˆt
∑
ν
cν |ν〉, (9)
which implies that
|ψ(t)〉 = eiωˆt|ψ(0)〉, (10)
and this is equivalent to the following evolution equation:
ωˆ|ψt〉 = i∂t|ψt〉. (11)
We have, therefore, transformed our original problem
into one in which we seek an operator ωˆ for the particu-
lar perception problem at hand. In the example discussed
previously ωˆ is a general 2× 2 Hermitian matrix.
This is a Schro¨dinger-like equation of motion describ-
ing the dynamics of cognitive processes. Hence, the state
of potential consciousness evolves in a similar way as
the state vector evolves in standard quantum mechan-
ics (Von-Neumann, 1955), namely, as given by Eq. 10
where the time displacement (or evolution operator) Uˆ is
related to the frequency operator ωˆ = Hˆ/h¯ (where Hˆ is
the Hamiltonian in quantum mechanics and h¯ is Planck’s
constant) as follows
Uˆ = e
i
∫
t
0
ωˆ(t′)dt′
, (12)
namely, the frequency operator (which in general can
change as a function of time) is the generator of infinites-
imal translations in time. In our approach, Planck’s con-
stant does not enter in our equation of motion.
Conscious events that occur are identified with the
quantum mechanical “collapses” of the wave function,
as specified by the orthodox quantum theory and the
meaning of this concept was explained in subsection II.A
above. The wave function, between such perceptual
5events, describes a state of potential consciousness which
evolves via the Schro¨dinger equation. When a percep-
tual event is observed, where a wave-function “collapse”
occurs through the process of measurement, it actual-
izes the corresponding neural correlate of consciousness
(NCC) brain state.
III. APPLICATION TO BINOCULAR RIVALRY
A. Time evolution of potential consciousness
In binocular rivalry (Blake and Logothetis, 2002;
Leopold and Logothetis, 1999; Tong, 2003), which is an
example of multi-stable perception (Orbach et al., 1966),
two different images are presented dichoptically to aware-
ness. These two images are the stimuli for two different
potential percepts and form the basis vectors in terms of
which to express the general state of potential conscious-
ness. The action of consciousness, i.e., through conscious
attention, at a higher level causes the perception of a par-
ticular potentiality as a real event in consciousness by ac-
tivating one particular percept. Through this operation
of consciousness, the conscious percept (or symbol) acts
and activates the corresponding neural correlates of con-
sciousness (NCC) in the nervous system. Furthermore,
a sequence of ordered events arise in consciousness as a
time series t1, t2, ..., tn , at each one of which a perceptual
change occurs and this defines a flow in consciousness.
State vector formulation: For clarity, we begin with the
state vector formulation and below, the problem is also
discussed using the density matrix formalism for com-
pleteness. We imagine two potential states of conscious-
ness denoted as |1〉 and |2〉 which correspond to the two
states which can be realized in the case of binocular ri-
valry, which are associated with two distinct NCC brain
states. An arbitrary state of potential consciousness will
be written as in Eq. 1 with
|c1|
2 + |c2|
2 = 1, (13)
such that, after the process of projection, the probabil-
ity for either distinct state to become actual, is unity.
Therefore, in binocular rivalry, we have two rival states of
consciousness associated with percepts |1〉 and |2〉 which,
in turn, correspond to two different NCC states.
For binocular rivalry, and more generally for a two-
state problem ωˆ is a 2× 2 matrix,
ωˆ =
(
〈1|ωˆ|1〉 〈1|ωˆ|2〉
〈2|ωˆ|1〉 〈2|ωˆ|2〉
)
=
(
ǫ1 h12
h21 ǫ2
)
. (14)
As discussed in Sec. II.C, the operator ωˆ must be a Her-
mitian operator, therefore, h21 = h
∗
12. To simplify the
problem, let us consider, the case where ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ
(namely, the two rival states are “degenerate”, i.e., there
is no preference for or bias against one or the other).
In order to solve Eq. 11 in the case where ωˆ is
time-independent, we generally proceed (Bohm, 1979;
Von-Neumann, 1955) by finding the eigenvalues ων and
the eigenstates |ν〉 of the operator ωˆ and by expanding
the initial state |ψ(0)〉 in the basis formed by the eigen-
states, i.e.,
|ψ(0)〉 =
∑
ν
cν |ν〉, (15)
and the general time-dependent solution is given by
Eq. 8.
Let us suppose that the initial state is just one of
the two states, for example state |1〉. As long as there
is no observation (conscious or involuntary attempts to
project), the state of potential consciousness as a func-
tion of time is in a state given as follows:
|ψt〉 = cos(ω¯t)|1〉 − ie
−iφ sin(ω¯t)|2〉. (16)
The frequency ω¯ = |h12| and it is given as ω¯ = 2π/T ; T is
the characteristic period of the instrument of conscious-
ness. The phase φ characterizes the off-diagonal matrix
elements h12 = ω¯e
iφ. The diagonal elements ǫ of ωˆ, in
the case where ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ, only contribute to an overall
phase which has no observable effects.
Let us consider the inquiry Q: “is the observed in state
|1〉?”, which, for the binocular rivalry case, is represented
by the same operator Qˆ given by Eq. 4. The expected
answer to the inquiry Q is obtained by Eq. 5, and by
straightforward substitution of Eq. 16 for the state |ν〉
we find that:
〈Qˆ〉 = cos2(ω¯t). (17)
Density matrix formulation: Now, let us turn our dis-
cussion to the formulation of the problem using the den-
sity matrix formalism. The density matrix for a general
two state system is given by
ρˆ =
(
〈1|ρˆ|1〉 〈1|ρˆ|2〉
〈2|ρˆ|1〉 〈2|ρˆ|2〉
)
=
(
ρ11 ρ12
ρ21 ρ22
)
. (18)
The equation of motion satisfied by the density matrix
operator is
i∂tρˆ = [ωˆ, ρˆ], (19)
where ωˆ is the frequency operator (ωˆ = Hˆ/h¯) given by
Eq. 14 for the binocular rivalry case. A measurement
or observation takes place by means of a conscious in-
quiry which is represented by a projection operator Qˆ
(i.e., Qˆ2 = Qˆ). For our case of the binocular rivalry the
projection operator is given by Eq. 4. The result of a
measurement is given as
〈Qˆ〉 =
Tr(ρˆQˆ)
Tr(ρˆ)
. (20)
If after such a measurement occurs and the answer is
“yes” the state of potential consciousness is represented
by a density matrix which equals the above projection
6operator Qˆ. If after the measurement is “no” the state of
potential consciousness is represented by a density matrix
given by 1ˆ− Qˆ.
Let us assume that at time t = 0 the state of poten-
tial consciousness corresponds to the state |1〉, i.e., to a
density matrix ρˆ = Qˆ. It is straightforward to show that
the density matrix ρˆ(t), which satisfies the equation of
motion (19) for any time t, is given by
ρˆ =
(
cos2(ω¯t) −i sin(ω¯t)cos(ω¯t)
i sin(ω¯t)cos(ω¯t) sin2(ω¯t)
)
. (21)
By substituting this expression for the density matrix in
Eq. 20 and using the expression given by Eq. 4 for the
operator Qˆ, we obtain the same result for 〈Qˆ〉 as in Eq. 17
above.
B. Measurement/projection in Binocular Rivalry
In order for an event to enter the stream of conscious-
ness, a projection/measurement (see Sec. II.B in the in-
troduction of this paper) must occur. Let us now assume
that after time δt an observation or measurement is car-
ried out where the state of consciousness is observed by
operating (operationally asking) the question Q: “is the
observed in state |1〉?”
This is asked by applying the operator Qˆ = |1〉〈1|
(Eq. 4) on the state of potential consciousness |ψt〉 and
the probability to observe the state |1〉 is given by
〈ψt|Qˆ|ψt〉 = cos
2(ω¯δt) (See Eq. 17). The operation of
the inquiry on the state of potential consciousness actu-
alizes the state |1〉 (or |2〉) with probability cos2(ω¯δt) (or
sin2(ω¯δt/T )). If δt << T/4 there is high probability to
observe the state |1〉. Therefore, if we keep making con-
scious or involuntary attempts to observe frequently, the
same state is projected (the quantum Zeno effect).
We will assume that in an interval 0 < t < tmax a series
of observing events occur each one of which causes the
neurons to fire in bursts as illustrated in Fig. 2. Let us
assume that the observations take place at time instants
t1, t2, ..., tn, ..., and these instances have been picked from
a given distribution, an example of which is given in
Fig. 2. The probability that the initial state during the
first i− 1 observations at the instances t1, t2, ..., ti−1 was
repeatedly found to be |1〉 and found to switch to |2〉 at
time ti, is
wi = sin
2(ω¯(ti − ti−1))
i−1∏
j=1
cos2(ω¯(tj − tj−1))). (22)
In this case the dominance duration of the initial state is
ti. Therefore, the probability density of dominance dura-
tion t is given as P (t) =
∑n
i=1 wiδ(t− ti). This probabil-
ity density can be calculated using a random walk Monte
Carlo process where the time instants of the measurement
events t1, t2,...,tn, are chosen from a desired distribution
similar to that of Fig. 2. One simple choice of such a
sampling technique is to select the first Nf events which
constitute the first burst as ti = ti−1 + δt (with t0 = 0)
where the variable δt is chosen from a Gaussian distri-
bution with variance Tf (or as a random variable uni-
formly distributed in the interval [0, Tf ]). Similarly, the
beginning of the next burst is chosen from a Gaussian
distribution with variance Tb (or as a uniform random
variable in the interval [0, Tb]). A sample train of three
such bursts produced using Gaussian distributions with
Tf = 5msec, Nf = 60 and Tb = 0.9sec is shown in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2 Illustration of the neuronal activity or measurement
events needed to understand the distribution of dominance
duration in binocular rivalry. Notice that there are the fol-
lowing time scales. (a) A long time scale Tb, the average time
between neuronal firing bursts, (b) the duration of the burst
δT , and (c) the average firing rate rf = 1/Tf within each
burst. Notice that Tb is of the order of 1 sec, δT is a fraction
of a second and fs of the order of 100Hz. (Engel et al., 1992;
Gray, 1994; Gray and Singer, 1989; Singer and Gray, 1995)
In Section IX(Appendix) we present a detailed study
of this model and how the results differ by changing the
neuron firing rates.
IV. RESULTS AND COMPARISON WITH EXPERIMENT
A. Probability distribution of dominance duration
In Fig. 3, the distribution of dominance duration ob-
tained using the present model is compared with the
data obtained by Lehky (Lehky, 1995) and in Fig. 4 it
is compared with the data obtained by Levelt (Levelt,
1968). The values of the parameters used in the fit,
which are given in the figure captions, are reasonable.
Neuron firing frequencies of the order of 100Hz have
been used in these calculations. As discussed in the ap-
pendix the probability distribution of dominance dura-
tion is not sensitive to the precise value of the spike fre-
quency as long as the burst duration is kept constant.
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Figure 3 Comparison with the data from Lehky is made using
T = 6.2sec, Tb = 0.9sec and Tf = 10msec and Nf = 28 (only
the combination δT = TfNf = 0.28sec is relevant).
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Figure 4 Comparison with the data from Levelt using Tb =
0.5, δT = 0.1, and T = 3. Time in Ref. (Levelt, 1968) is
in units of the mean dominance duration. The time scale
T is the period characterizing the evolution of the state of
potential consciousness (See Section II.C).
Namely, by varying the spike frequency by even a fac-
tor of two or more (within the observed range of neuron
firing frequency for the mammalian brain (Fries et al.,
2002)) and keeping the burst duration constant, we ob-
tain the same probability distribution of dominance du-
ration. The value of the frequency T is determined by
setting the scale of time for the graph; the other pa-
rameters, which define the neuron firing pattern, are the
average time between bursts Tb and the burst duration
δT and their values are consistent with the neuron fir-
ing pattern observed for the alert cat (Engel et al., 1992;
Gray and Singer, 1989; Singer and Gray, 1995). The fir-
ing pattern of single cells in the striate cortex of macaque
monkeys (Martinez-Conde et al., 2000) indicate similar
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Figure 5 Comparison of the theoretical distribution of dom-
inance duration (solid line) with the data from subjects un-
der the influence of the hallucinogen LSD. The theoreti-
cal curve is obtained using T = 2.0sec, Tb = 0.25sec and
δT = TfNf = 1sec.
neuron firing patterns. The firing patterns might be
somewhat different for neurons of the human cerebral
or extra striate cortex, which is the case of our inter-
est; therefore, the values found, in order to achieve good
agreement with the observed PDDD, are reasonable.
The value of the oscillation period T is of similar
magnitude to a value known as a characteristic time
scale for a low-frequency mechanism that binds succes-
sive events into perceptual units (Peterson and Peterson,
1959; Po¨ppel, 1997). In a study of the human auditory
sensory system by examining the mismatch negativity
(MMN) using SQUID magnetometry (Sams et al., 1993)
it was found that the amplitude of the MMN as a func-
tion of the inter-stimulus interval becomes large at a time
scale of the order of 3sec. More recently direct functional
MRI measurements (Lumer et al., 1998; Polonsky et al.,
2000; Tong and Engel, 2001; Tong et al., 1998) demon-
strate that the perceived alteration is accompanied by
responses in extra-striate cortex areas which are charac-
terized by such time scales. In addition, oscillations at
such very low frequencies which correspond to a fraction
of a Hz have been observed in EEG patterns during the
deep stages of sleep of humans (Achermann and Borbely,
1997; Ferri et al., 2005; Hobson, 2005) and of the cat cere-
bral cortex (Destexhe et al., 1999).
In studies (Carter and Pettigrew, 2003) with a sub-
ject who took the hallucinogenic drug LSD an oscilla-
tory behavior of the distribution of dominance duration
was revealed. In Fig. 5, the distribution obtained for the
case of binocular rivalry and motion-induced blindness
(MIB) from the subject under the influence of LSD is
compared with the present model when we use the val-
ues of the parameters shown in the inset. Therefore, we
conclude that, within the context of our model, the hallu-
cinogenic drug changes the burst frequency and the char-
8acteristic period T significantly, which places the observ-
ing conscious apparatus into a regime where oscillations
are transparent. More recent studies on the influence
of hallucinogenic drugs (Carter et al., 2007, 2005) indi-
cate that it might be in the “rebound-phase” (a phase
reached several hours after the peak of the drug influ-
ence) that a state of the type indicated in Fig. 5 and in
Ref. (Carter and Pettigrew, 2003) may be realized and
that this state may not be related at all to the state
of consciousness reached at the peak of the LSD influ-
ence. More specifically, in Ref. (Carter et al., 2005), it
was found that the response of subjects at the peak of the
drug influence was found to be significantly slower; how-
ever, switches for all subjects became increasingly faster,
such that six hours later some subjects were switching
at intervals that were shorter, more regular and more
rhythmic than their pretest levels. Therefore, this is also
consistent with the results of Ref. (Carter and Pettigrew,
2003) where the subject was tested many hour later than
the peak of the drug influence.
We would like to comment about the so-called weak
quantum theory (WQT) (Atmanspacher et al., 2002)
which is an attempt to generalize the formal framework of
quantum theory in such a way that complementarity and
entanglement might be useful in a broader context. The
WQT has been used to describe ambiguous perception
(Atmanspacher et al., 2008, 2004). There are the follow-
ing important differences between the present work and
WQT and its applications (Atmanspacher et al., 2008,
2004): (a) The formalism used in the present paper to
describe the dynamics of the mental processes, is identi-
cal to that of orthodox quantum theory and we found no
need to resort to some other mathematical foundation
in the present paper. In addition, there are important
differences between the two mathematical models, as ap-
plied to the problem of multi-stable perception, namely
between the application of WQT and our work. (b) In the
present paper the problem of binocular rivalry is studied
rather than the problem of ambiguous perception.
B. Periodic removal of stimulus
Next, we discuss the results of Ref. (Leopold et al.,
2002) where the stimulus was periodically removed as
shown in Fig. 6. Namely, the stimulus appears and dis-
appears periodically and both rival images are presented
to awareness for a time interval Ton, and for a time inter-
val Toff both images are removed. It was found that the
frequency of perceptual alterations can be slowed down,
and even brought to almost a standstill. These experi-
mental results are very important because they provide
clear support for the present theory.
Here, we are dealing with a frequency operation and
a time-evolution operator which changes with time as
measured by an external clock. Namely, the frequency
operator is given by a constant operator ωˆ(t) = ωˆ (which
is a 2× 2 matrix), in the on-stimulus time intervals and
ωˆ(t) = 0 in the off-stimulus intervals. When the rival
images are presented, the evolution occurs according to
the frequency operator ωˆ given by Eq. 14 and when they
are totally absent the frequency operator is a constant C
(which can be taken to be zero). The general solution of
the Schro¨dinger-like equation, when ωˆ(t) is time depen-
dent, is given by |ψt〉 = e
i
∫
t
0
dt′ωˆ(t′)
|ψ0〉, which implies
that |ψ(t)〉 in the on-stimulus intervals evolves as before
and during the off-stimulus interval the state of potential
consciousness “freezes”.
In Fig. 7 the probability distribution of the dominance
duration is shown. Notice that the probability distri-
bution which corresponds to continuous presentation of
the stimulus (solid line), splits into separate parts (gray-
shaded) with duration Ton, when the stimulus is pre-
sented intermittently. However, if we eliminate these
blank intervals (as if they did not exist) and the sepa-
rate parts are placed side by side, the result is the same
as the distribution obtained with continuous presenta-
tion of the stimulus. This result has a number of conse-
quences and we would like to mention the following two:
(a) For fixed Ton, the average dominance duration grows
linearly with the blank duration Toff . (b) For fixed blank
duration Toff , the average dominance duration decreases
with increasing Ton. These conclusions agree well with
the available experimental results (Leopold et al., 2002;
Orbach et al., 1966).
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Figure 6 The periodic switching on and off of the rival stimuli.
The rival figures are dichoptically presented to awareness for
an interval Ton and they are removed for a blank interval
Toff = Text − Ton where Text is the period of the externally
modulated stimulus. Random observations take place during
the on-intervals with an average frequency fs = 1/Ts.
We would like to note that when the stimulus turns
on after the blank duration, the change itself is expected
to cause a measurement. Our simulation shows that,
if at the beginning of the “stimulus on” periods we al-
ways start with a burst of Nf measurements and the
bursts which follow this initial burst are selected accord-
ing to the same probability distribution, there is addi-
tional broadening of the distribution, thus, further in-
creasing the dominance duration. In this case the above
mentioned features (a) and (b) are only approximately
valid.
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Figure 7 Probability distribution of dominance duration in
binocular rivalry with intermittent stimulus. The average
time between bursts Tb/T is taken to be 0.1 and the width of
the burst is δt/T = 0.05. (a) Solid line: Continuous stimulus.
(b) Gray-shaded: Intermittent presentation of stimulus. (c)
Doted-line: The distribution of part (a) where the time axis
is scaled by a factor (Ton + Toff )/Ton.
V. DISCUSSION
The present explanation of the phenomenon observed,
when the stimulus was periodically removed, is based on
the fact that our theory places the attention of conscious-
ness higher, in the hierarchy of consciousness, than the
two stimulated neural correlates in the brain. If we in-
terrupt the external process which presents to awareness
the mixture of the two potential states, the state of po-
tential consciousness remains (as memory, with no oscil-
latory evolution) on the most recently collapsed percept;
namely, because of the interruption of the external stimu-
lation of the rival state, there is no reason for alterations
of the state of potential consciousness because there is
no likelihood associated with the other percept. There-
fore, when a new stimulation occurs, where both con-
scious symbols are presented to awareness, evolution of
the state of potential consciousness begins starting from
the previously collapsed state. Thus, shortly afterwards,
the state of potential consciousness will collapse again
in the previously collapsed state with high probability.
Hence, when the external presentation to awareness of
the stimulus is halted, the time evolution of the state
of potential consciousness stops, and the perceived time
stands still.
Role of Attention: There are recent stud-
ies (Chong and Blake, 2005; Mitchell et al., 2004;
Ooi and He, 1999) where attention can bias the initial
selection of state in binocular rivalry toward the at-
tended state (or stimulus). In our formulation attention
is a fundamental aspect of consciousness. Attention is
the voluntary or involuntary preparation of the state of
potential consciousness with increased likelihood, which
causes biased preference, for a certain event or events
to occur. If the initial state of potential consciousness
is prepared in such a way to be the state |1〉, this state
will be a preferred state when an event occurs soon
afterwards.
There are two types of factors which can enhance at-
tention. 1) Bottom-up factors: If we make the diagonal
terms of the operator ωˆ different, the probability distribu-
tion of dominance durations for state |1〉 and for |2〉 would
be equal. However, the transition rates would be smaller,
a fact that prolongs dominance durations (because there
is a potential barrier to be crossed for the oscillations
to occur). This is in agreement with the experimental
conclusions (Chong et al., 2005; Meng and Tong, 2004).
2) Top-down factors: Instructing the observer to pay at-
tention to one particular perceptual state influences and
modulates the frequency of measurements. When one
eye’s stimulus is strengthened (e.g. by increasing con-
trast), the mean dominance duration of the other (unaf-
fected) eye decreases (Levelt, 1968). In this case the rate
of observations fs is different for each of the two eyes.
The contrast difference causes the “observer” to increase
the rate of observations of one of the states when that
state is being experienced.
VI. THE ISSUE OF DECOHERENCE
If we consider the formalism of quantum theory as a
mathematical foundation that describes the microscopic
world, it is very difficult to make a convincing argument
that the brain dynamics is governed by quantum the-
ory because of the issue of decoherence (Giulini et al.,
1996; Joos and Zeh, 1985; Tegmark, 2000; Zeh, 1970). In
this work, however, we argued that quantum theory is a
broader foundation and it can describe the subjective ex-
perience of our thought process and more generally, the
perception process. We have reasoned that we can use
the formalism of quantum mechanics to describe the tes-
timony of observers where their subjective experience is
recorded.
Taking this work seriously, we may postulate that the
formalism of quantum theory primarily describes the pro-
cess of perception and thought. According to such an
approach, the reason for the applicability of quantum
theory in the microscopic phenomena is because the char-
acter of our interaction with the microscopic world can
be viewed in the same way as was done here for the case
of the perception/thought process. The stimuli from the
external world reach our consciousness only through the
application of the abstract process of thought and per-
ception (Von-Neumann, 1955). Therefore, in order to
describe the external world as it is perceived by our con-
scious apparatus, we need to treat it using the same for-
mulation used to describe the process of perception and
thought. Otherwise we would use two different ways of
describing our interaction with the external stimuli and
this would be inconsistent.
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The experimental activity to determine the properties
of matter at the atomic or subatomic level can be re-
garded as an application of the process of perception and
thought through the elaborate extension of our sensory
apparatus, i.e., using the experimental instruments which
are made using the thought process. The questions we
ask, when probing the microscopic world, are based on
mentally conceived notions while the “object of obser-
vation” behaves as “stimulus” to the observing device
which is an extension to our sensory apparatus. Fur-
thermore, when we operationally apply our mental con-
structs through the observing instruments to the micro-
scopic world, they cause significant effects on the nature
of the outcome of the perception or measurement pro-
cess. Namely, the nature of the questions raised in this
case have a determining effect on the observed and, this
clearly forces us to use more explicitly and more clearly
the formalism which describes the process of the opera-
tion of thought and perception. Classical mechanics is
just a limit of quantum theory when the perturbation
caused on the observed as a result of the measurement
process is relatively small.
Therefore, in order to describe the operation of con-
sciousness and of thought one does not have to explain
how the decoherence is avoided in the brain (Tegmark,
2000). This becomes an issue only in the case where
one believes that quantum theory is a theory only de-
scribing microscopic particles and, thus, when one tries
to explain the brain activity starting from such a belief
it is difficult to understand how decoherence effects do
not become important. Here, however, a very different
argument is used, namely, that the mental/abstract pro-
cess of thought and consciousness is mathematically de-
scribed by the formalism of quantum theory as described
in Sec. II; the fact that the formalism of quantum theory
is applicable in the microscopic world follows from this
assertion. According to this scenario, in order to describe
the process of throught using the formalism of quantum
theory, we do not need to identify microscopic processes
and to show that they survive the effects of environmen-
tal decoherence. It is simply the wrong basis, the wrong
level to begin in order to describe the operation of con-
sciousness.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, the present theory accurately describes:
(a) the distribution of dominance duration in binocu-
lar rivalry; (b) the qualitative change in distribution of
dominance duration and the appearance of oscillations in
subjects which were studied under the influence of hal-
lucinogenic drugs which, as is found, increase the neuron
firing rates and decrease the potential frequency; (c) the
marked increase in dominance duration by periodic re-
moval of the stimulus.
Furthermore, for binocular rivalry experiments where
the stimulus is periodically removed, a distribution of
perceptual alterations as a function of time is predicted
and this can be tested in future experiments.
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IX. APPENDIX
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Figure 8 Comparison of P (t) obtained for different firing rates
but keeping the duration of firing and everything else con-
stant.
In this appendix we study the role of the parameters
which control the neuron firing rates and the various
qualitative different regimes of the present model.
In Fig. 8 we study the effect of changing the firing fre-
quency within any given burst. Therefore we keep the
other parameters, namely, the average interval between
the end of a burst and the beginning of the next burst
Tb/T = 0.1 and the burst duration δT ≡ NfTf = 0.1,
fixed. Notice that if we change the number of measure-
ments (which result to neuron firings) within each burst
from 10 to 50 the calculated probability distribution of
dominance duration P (t) changes significantly only for
0 < t ≤ δT . This means that when the average interval
between measurements is reduced the probability for per-
ceptual change is significantly reduced. The reason for
that change is the so-called quantum Zeno effect. This
can be easily understood if we consider that the measure-
ments are done at equally spaced intervals δt = δT/Nf .
The expression given for the transition probability gives
PNf (t) = (cos(ω¯δT/Nf ))
2Nf sin2(ω¯δT/Nf ) (23)
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Figure 9 Comparison of P (t) obtained for Tf/T = 0.001 and
Nf = 50 and Nf = 500. Top: Tb/T = 0.5. Bottom Tb/T =
1.0.
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Figure 10 Comparison of P (t) obtained for Tb/T = 0.1 and
Tf/T = 0.001. Top: Nf = 50. Middle: Nf = 500. Bottom:
Nf = 1000.
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Figure 11 Comparison of P (t) obtained for different small
values of Tb/T (0.1 (top), 0.05 (center), and 0.02 (bottom))
for Tf/T = 0.005 and Nf = 10. The decay time constant
increases by decreasing Tb. Notice the difference in the scale
of time used in the graphs.
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and for large Nf the leading term is
PNf→∞(t) =
( ω¯δT
Nf
)2
. (24)
In Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 we demonstrate the effect of in-
creasing the burst duration δT . We need to distinguish
two regimes:
1. When δT ≤ Tb. In Fig. 9 it is demonstrated that,
by increasing Nf from 50 to 500, the initial interval
where P (t) is small (of the order of that given by
Eq. 24) is extended and it is of the order of δT . The
oscillatory behavior of the function P (t) which is
controlled by the period T is unchanged but with
the onset delayed by δT .
2. When δT > Tb, as in the example of Fig. 10. In this
case an increase of δT leads to an oscillatory be-
havior with period given approximately by δT . In
Fig. 10 (middle and bottom) the dashed line is the
average measurement probability density. Notice
the oscillatory behavior of the measurement prob-
ability density matches the oscillatory behavior of
P (t).
In Fig. 11 the function P (t) calculated for small values of
Tb/T (and δT/T = 0.05) is plotted. The function P (t) for
large t decays exponentially with a decay time constant
which increases by decreasing Tb as in the quantum Zeno
case.
In Fig. 12 the function P (t) calculated for larger values
of Tb/T (and δT/T = 0.05) is plotted. The function P (t)
is oscillating with period T and with envelop of the oscil-
lation decays exponentially with a decay time constant
which increases by increasing Tb.
References
Achermann, P. and Borbely, A. A. (1997). Low frequency (< 1
hz) oscillations in the human sleep electroencephalogram.
Neurosci., 81(1):213.
Atmanspacher, H., Bach, M., Filk, T., Kornmeier, J., and
Roemer, H. (2008). Cognitive time scales in a necker-zeno
model for bistable perception. Open Cybernetics and Sys-
temics Journal, 2:234–251.
Atmanspacher, H., Filk, T., and Roemer, H. (2004). Quantum
zeno features of bistable perception. Biol. Cybern., 90:33.
Atmanspacher, H., Roemer, H., and Walach, H. (2002). Weak
quantum theory: complementarity and entanglement in
physics and beyond. Found. Phys., 32:379.
Blake, R. and Logothetis, N. (2002). Visual competition. Na-
ture Rev. Neurosci., 3:13.
Bohm, D. (1979). Quantum Mechanics. Dover, New York.
Carter, O. I. and Pettigrew, J. D. (2003). A common oscillator
for perceptual rivalries? Perception, 32:295.
Carter, O. L., Hasler, F., Pettigrew, J. D., Wallis, G. M., Liu,
G. B., and Vollenweider, F. X. (2007). Psilocybin links
binocular rivalry switch rate to attention and subjective
arousal levels in humans. Psychopharmacology, 195:415–
424.
Carter, O. L., Pettigrew, J. D., Hasler, F., Wallis, G. M., Liu,
G. B., Hell, D., and Vollenweider, F. X. (2005). Modulating
the rate and rhythmicity of perceptual rivalry alternations
with the mixed 5-ht2a and 5-ht1a agonist psilocybin. Neu-
ropsychopharmacology, 30:1154.
Chong, S. C. and Blake, R. (2005). Exogenous and endoge-
nous attention influence initial dominance in binocular ri-
valry. J. Vision, 5(8):1045a.
Chong, S. C., Tadin, D., and Blake, R. (2005). Endogenous at-
tention prolongs dominance durations in binocular rivalry.
J. Vision, 5:1004.
Destexhe, A., Conteras, D., and Steriade, M. (1999). Spa-
tiotemporal analysis of local field potentials and unit dis-
charges in cat cerebral cortex during natural wake and sleep
states. J. Neurosci., 19(11):4595.
Engel, A. K., Konig, P., Kreiter, A., Schillen, T. B., and
Singer, W. (1992). Temporal coding in the visual cortex:
new vistas on integration in the nervous system. Trends
Neurosci., 15:218.
Ferri, R., Bruni, O., Miano, S., Plazzi, G., and Terzano, M. G.
(2005). All-night eeg power spectral analysis of the cyclic
alternating pattern components in young adult subjects.
Clin. Neurophys., 116:2429.
Freeman, A. W. (2005). Multistage model for binocular ri-
valry. J. Neurophysiol., 94:4412.
Fries, P., Schro¨der, J.-H., Roelfsema, P. R., Singer, W., and
Engel, A. K. (2002). Oscillatory neuronal synchronization
in primary visual cortex as a correlate of stimulus selection.
J. Neurosci., 22:3739.
Giulini, D., Joos, E., Kieffer, C., Kupsch, J., Stamatescu,
I. O., and Zeh, H. D. (1996). Decoherence and the Appear-
ance of a Classical World in Quantum Theory. Springer
New York.
Gray, C. M. (1994). Synchronous oscillations in neuronal
systems: Mechanisms and functions. J. Comp. Neurosci.,
1:11–38.
Gray, C. M. and Singer, W. (1989). Stimulus-specific neu-
ronal oscillations in orientation columns of cat visual cor-
tex. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 86:1698.
Hobson, J. A. (2005). Sleep is of the brain, by the brain and
for the brain. Nature, 437:1254.
Joos, E. and Zeh, H. D. (1985). The emergence of classical
properties through interaction with the environment. Z.
Phys., B59:223–243.
Jung, C. G. and Pauli, W. (2001). Atom and the Archetype:
Pauli/Jung Letters, 1932-1958. ed. C. A. Meier, (Princeton
University Press, Princeton).
Lehky, S. R. (1995). Binocular rivalry is not chaotic. Proc,
R, Soc, Lond., B 259:71.
Leopold, D. A. and Logothetis, N. K. (1999). Multistable
phenomena: changing views in perception. Trends of Cogn.
Sci., 3:254.
Leopold, D. A., Wilke, M., Mair, A., and Logothetis, N.
(2002). Stable perception of visually ambiguous patterns.
Nature Neurosci., 5:605.
Levelt, W. J. M. (1968). Psychological Studies on Binocular
Rivalry. Mouton, Hague.
London, F. and Bauer, E. (1983). Quantum Theory and Mea-
surement. J. A. Wheeler and W. H. Zurek eds., pg 217
(Princeton University Press, Princeton).
Lumer, E. D., Friston, K. J., and Rees, G. (1998). Neural
correlates of perceptual rivalry in the human brain. Science,
280:1930.
Manousakis, E. (2006). Founding quantum theory on the basis
13
of consciousness. Found. Phys., 36(6):795.
Martinez-Conde, S., Macknik, S. L., and Hubel, D. H. (2000).
Microsaccadic eye movements and firing of single cells in
the striate cortex of macaque monkeys. Nature Neurosci,
3:251.
Mavromatos, N. E. and Nanopoulos, D. V. (1998). On quan-
tum mechanical aspects of microtubules. J. Mod. Phys., B
12:517.
Meng, M. and Tong, F. (2004). Can attention selectively bias
bistable perception? differences between binocular rivalry
and ambiguous figures. J. Vision, 4:539–551.
Mitchell, J. F., Stoner, G. R., and Reynolds, J. H. (2004).
Object-based attention determines dominance in binocular
rivalry. Nature, 429:410.
Ooi, T. L. and He, Z. J. (1999). Binocular rivalry and visual
awareness: The role of attention. Perception, 28:551.
Orbach, J., Zucker, E., and Olson, R. (1966). Reversibility of
the necker cube vii. reversal time as a function of figure-
on and figure-off durations. Perceptual and Motor Skills,
22:615.
Penrose, R. (1989). The emperor’s new mind. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, NY.
Peterson, L. R. and Peterson, M. J. (1959). Shortterm reten-
tion of individual verbal items. J. Exp. Psychol., 58(3):193.
Polonsky, A., Blake, R., Braun, J., and Heeger, D. J. (2000).
Neuronal activity in human primary visual cortex corre-
lates with perception during binocular rivalry. Nat. Neu-
rosci., 3(11):1153.
Po¨ppel, E. (1997). A hierarchical model of temporal percep-
tion. Trends Cognit. Sci., 1:56–61.
Sams, M., Hari, R., Rif, J., and Knuutila, J. (1993). The
human auditory sensory memory trace persists about 10
sec: neuromagnetic evidence. J. Cogn. Neurosci., 5(3):363.
Schroedinger, E. (1967). What is life? and Mind and Matter.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Schwartz, J. M., Stapp, H. P., and Beauregard, M. (2005).
Quantum physics in neuroscience and psychology: a neu-
rophysical model of mind-brain interaction. Phil. Tran.
Royal Soc., B 360(1458):1306.
Schwartz, O., Hsu, A., and Dayan, P. (2007). Space and time
in visual context. Nature Rev. Neurosci., 8:522.
Singer, W. and Gray, C. M. (1995). Visual feature integra-
tion and the temporal correlation hypothesis. Annu. Rev.
Neurosci., 18:555.
Stapp, H. P. (1980). Locality and reality. Found. Phys.,
10:767.
Stapp, H. P. (2003). Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics.
Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
Stapp, H. P. (2007). Mindful Universe: Quantum Mechanics
and the Participaring Observer. Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
Tegmark (2000). The importance of quantum decoherence in
brain processes. Phys. Rev. E., 61:4194–4206.
Tong, F. (2003). Primary visual cortex and visual awareness.
Nature Rev. Neurosci., 4:219.
Tong, F. and Engel, S. A. (2001). Interocular rivalry revealed
in the human cortical blind-spot representation. Nature,
411:195.
Tong, F., Meng, M., and Blake, R. (2006). Neural bases of
binocular rivalry. Trends Cogn Sci, 10:512.
Tong, F., Nakayama, K., Vaughan, J. T., and Kanwisher, N.
(1998). Binocular rivalry and visual awareness in human
extrastriate cortex. Neuron, 21:753.
Von-Neumann, J. (1955). Mathematical Foundations of Quan-
tum Mechanics, Chap. VI, pg. 417. Princeton University
Press, Princeton.
Wigner, E. P. (1983). Quantum Theory and Measurement. J.
A. Wheeler and W. H. Zurek eds., pg 260 and 325 (Prince-
ton University Press, Princeton).
Zeh, H. D. (1970). Toward a quantum theory of observation.
Found. Phys., 1:69–76.
